Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1981

Rosalind Jackson v. Virginius "Jinx" Dabney and
James N. Barber : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errorsRay R. Christensen; Attorney for DefendantRespondentMichael J. Wilkins; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Jackson v. Dabney, No. 17601 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2575

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ROSALIND JACKSON,

~.

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
VIRGINIUS "JINX" DABNEY,
Defendant-Respondent,

Case No. 17601

and
JAMES N. BARBER,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

An Appeal from the Order granting the
Motion for Summary Judgment in the Third Judicial ~
for Sa 1t Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 1'4. D••
Presiding

MICHAEL J. Will<.l:NS
WILKINS &WILKIRS
Attorneys for
200 South Main
Salt Lake City,

~:!~~'

RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
CHRISTEN SEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
900 Kearns Building
Lake City,
Utah 84101
Salt Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'

-IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ROSALIND JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

VIRGINIUS "JINX" DABNEY,
Defendant-Respondent,

Case No. 17601

and
JAMES N. BARBER,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

An Appeal from the Order granting the defendant-respondent's
Motion for Summary Judgment in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable M. D. Jones, Judge
Presiding

MICHAEL J. WILKINS
WILKINS &WILKINS
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
200 South Main Street, Suite 1020
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake
City,
Sponsored
by the S.J.Utah
Quinney 84101
Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2-4

ARGUMENT .

4-10
POINT I: GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS
EXISTED, ON THE RECORD, AT THE TIME OF THE GRANTING
OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

SUMMARY

POINT II: AT THE TIME THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT DABNEY,
HE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6-7

POINT III: THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

7-10
10

.

CASES CITED
BIHLMAIER V. CARSON, (Ut., 1979) 603 P.2d 790

7-8

BLODGETT V. MARTSCH, (Ut., 1978) 590 P.2d 298

8

CORBRIDGE V. M. MORRISON and SON, INC., (Ut., 1967) 19 Utah
2d 407, 432 P.2d 41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

DUNN V. McKAY, BURTON, McMURRAY and THURMOND, (Ut., 1978)
584 P.2d 894 . . . . . .

5

DURFEY V. BO. of ED. of WAYNE CITY., ETC., (Ut., 1979)
604 P.2d 480 . . . . . . . . .

7

ELLIS V. GILBERT, (Ut., 1967) 429 P.2d 39

5

. · . · ·

HOLBROOK COMPANY V. ADAMS, (Ut., 1975) 542 P.2d 191

6

LOWELL V. SALT LAKE CITY, (Ut., 1896) 13 Utah 91, 44 P. 1050 · 7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page(s)
LUCAS V. HAM, (Cal. 1961) 56 Cal2d 583, 364 P.2d 685.

5

NEAL V. MAGANA, OLNEY, LEVY, CATHCART and GELFAND,
(Cal. 1971) 98 Cal Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421

5

PIONEER SAVINGS and LAON ASSOCIATION V. PIONEER FINANCE
and THRIFT COMPANY, (Ut., 1966) 18 Utah 2d 106,
417 P.2d 121 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

PRESTONE V. LAMB, (Ut., 1968) 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021

8

SINGLETON V. ALEXANDER, (Ut., 1967) 19 Utah 2d 292, 431
P.2d 126
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6, 8

TANGREN V. INGALLS, (Ut., 1961) 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 P.2d
179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

l0

THOMPSON V. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, (Ut., 1964) 16 Utah 2d 30,
395 P. 2d 62
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

AUTHORITIES CITED
38 Am. Jur. Negligence

§345 .

57 Am. Jur. 2d. Negligence

§9

8

7

RULES
56 (c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

.......... · · 7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ROSALIND JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
VIRGINIUS "JINX" DABNEY,
Defendant-Respondent,

Case No. 17601

~d

JAMES N. BARBER,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-appellant brought an action alleging that defendantrespondent, an attorney licensed to practice in Utah, had been negligent
in the disposition of a matter entrusted by the plaintiff-appellant to the
care of the defendant-respondent.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Prior to trial, defendant-respondent Dabney moved for Su11111ary
Judgment against the plaintiff-appellant, which was granted below.
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant respectfully requests that the decision
of the 1ower court be reversed and the p 1aintiff-appe11 ant be permitted
to present evidence to prove her claim at a trial upon the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant Jackson was a client of defendant-respono:
Dabney, an attorney licensed to practice in Utah.
Page 105, hereinafter "R. 105").

(Trial Court Record

Plaintiff-appellant sought defendant·

respondent Dabney's legal advise and help in preventing a foreclosu~~
of her home.

(R. 105-106).

She took to him the Notice of Sale and other

legal documents in her possession prior to the sale.

(R. 140).

At

defendant-respondent Dabney' s suggestion, she acquired $400. 00 cash to

ce

used for the settlement offer, and de 1 i vered it to defendant-respondent
Dabney prior to the sale.

(R. 140).

On that same day, while she was

present in his office, defendant-respondent Dabney spoke on the telephoni
with someone he identified as the attorney representing the judgment
creditor, and reported to plaintiff-appellant that he had secured

~e

agreement of the opposing attorney to stop the foreclosure sale for pa)'ff!'
of the $400.00.

(R. 128, 129, 141).

Plaintiff-appellant, having

delivered the $400.00 to defendant-respondent Dabney and having heard t~:'.
the matter was reso 1 ved for $400. 00, 1 eft defendant-respondent Dabney's
office, and the matter in his care.

(R. 141, 129).

Accardi ng to defendant-respondent Dabney' s answers to plaintii:
appellant's

interrogatories, defendant-respondent Dabney did not

art~0

to deliver the $400.00 to the foreclosing attorney, did not reduce the

-2-
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settlement agreement in writing, did not confirm the settlement by letter
with the opposing attorney, did not check with the sheriff's office to
determine whether or not the sale had been cancelled, and did not appear
at the time and place of the sale to assure the sale did not take place.
(R. 128).

He took no further action to stop the foreclosure sale.

(R. 128).

A few days after the plaintiff-appellant had delivered the
$400.00 to defendant-respondent Dabney, defendant-respondent Dabney called
plaintiff-appellant saying that the sale had taken place, the home had been
sold and that he had her $400.00 in his possession.

He said that she

should redeem the property within the next six (6) months.

(R. 127, 141).

He did not advise her what procedure was necessary to effect a redemption.
Upon her demand, defendant-respondent Dabney returned the $400.00 to
plaintiff-appellant.

(R. 129).

Plaintiff-appellant then sought advise from defendant Barber,
also an attorney licensed to practice in Utah.
defendant Barber to help correct the problem.

Plaintiff-appellant asked
Defendant Barber assured

plaintiff-appellant that he would convince defendant-respondent Dabney to
correct his error.

During the six (6) month redemption period, plaintiff-

appellant acquired the necessary funds to redeem the residence.

She

informed defendant Barber of this fact and asked for advice on how to go
about redeeming.

Defendant Barber failed to instruct plaintiff-appellant

properly on how to redeem, and the redemption period expired with plaintiffappel lant still holding the necessary funds and not having redeemed her
residence.
Thereafter, plaintiff-appellant was evicted from the residence
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and brought this action against both attorneys claiming that her loss o'
the residence was a result of the negligence of both defendant-responder,
Dabney and defendant Barber.
Defendant-respondent Dabney brought a motion before the

Di~

Court seeking Summary Judgment of no cause action on the. grounds that nr
evidence of any negligent act on the part of defendant-respondent
was before the court.

(R. 109, 111).

oa~~

The Honorable M. D. Jones, Circu'

Judge of the Fifth Circuit sitting by designation as a District Judge,
granted defendant-respondent Dabney' s Mo ti on and entered a Summary Judgr•
against plaintiff-appellant for no cause of action against the defendan!respondent Dabney.

( R. 153- 154) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I

GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS EXISTED, ON THE
RECORD, AT THE TIME OF THE GRANTING OF THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
At the time the court below granted Summary Judgment, there
existed on the record several disputed issues material to the settlement
of the controversy.
Foremost, the plaintiff-appellant argued that the evidence
before the trial court showed the defendant-respondent had failed ~ ~
any action to assure the settlement, and that that was negligent, in

ur

the defendant-respondent failed to exercise ordinary care in the perfor
of his duties as the attorney for the plaintiff-appellant.

The defendal

respondent's position was that there was no evidence that the defendant·
respondent was guilty of any negligence.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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It is generally recognized that legal malpractice consists of
the failure of an attorney to use such skill, prudence and diligence as
lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in
the performance of the task which they undertake,

~ee

Lucas v. Ham,

(Cal. 1961) 56 Cal2d 583, 591, 15 Cal Rptr. 821, 825, 364 P.2d 685, 689]
and that when such failure proximately causes damages, it gives rise to
an action in tort.

Neal v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart and Gelfand,

(Cal. 1971) 98 Cal Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421.
Utah cases have stated that a lawyer has an obligation to discharge his duties in loyalty and fidelity to the interest of his client,
[Ellis v. Gilbert, (Ut., 1967) 429 P.2d 39] and also that there is an
implied covenant in an attorney's relationship to his client that he will
represent the client's interest with competence and diligence.

See Dunn v.

McKay, Burton, McMurray and Thurmond, (Ut., 1978) 584 P.2d 894.
In the present case, the plaintiff-appellant claims that the
defendant-respondent was negligent in the performance of his duties.

The

failure of the defendant-respondent to make any attempt to consumate the
settlement on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant demonstrated a lack of
concern for the welfare of the plaintiff-appellant and that the defendantrespondent failed to represent the plaintiff-appellant's interest with
competence and diligence.

In view of the fact that the defendant-respondent

was a professional man to whom the plaintiff-appellant, a layman, could
look as having competence to handle her case, it is clear that genuine
issues of fact are raised as to whether the defendant-respondent used due
care in performing the duties reasonably to be expected of an attorney under
-5-
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the circumstances.
Another disputed factual issue before the trial court was the
question of cause.

The defendant-respondent claimed that even if it cou

be said that he was negligent in failing to secure the compromise settle·
ment on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, only a small portion of the
plaintiff-appellant's injury could be attributable to him, not the total
value of lost, the lost equity.
On the other hand, the plaintiff-appellant stated under~~.
that had she known prior to the time of the foreclosure sale of her~
that the sale had not been stopped, she would have taken further steps
resolve the problem in an effort to prevent the sale.

tv

(R. 148).

In a recent case, the court states that "it on 1y takes one
sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of
the controversy and create an issue of fact".

Ho 1brook Company v. Adams,

(Ut., 1975) 542 P.2d 191.
POINT II
AT THE TIME THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT DABNEY, HE WAS NOT ENTITLED
TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
With respect to summary judgments, the court in Singleton v.
Alexander, (Ut., 1967) 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126, stated the followin~
When it comes to determining negligence, contributory
negligence and causation, courts are not in such a good
position to make a total determination for_ her~ enters
the prerogative of the jury to make determ1nat1on of its
own, and that is: Did the conduct of the party meas~re up
to that of a reasonable prudent man and if not, was it a
proximate cause of the harm done?
(Citation omitted, emphasis added.)
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In the same case, the court also quoted the following from the
earlier Utah case of Lowell v. Salt Lake City, (Ut., 1896) 13 Utah 91,
44 p.

1050:
Before the question of negligence becomes one of law,
for the court, the facts shown by the evidence must be
such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion
from them. If the facts proven are such that reasonable
men may fairly differ as to whether or not there was
negligence, the question is one for the jury to consider.
As discussed in Point I above, at the time the trial court

granted the Summary Judgment, the issue of negligence was very much in
dispute.

In this case it is a question of fact whether or not the

defendant-respondent acted as a lawyer of ordinary skill and capacity
would act.

Therefore, because this is a fact about which reasonable men

may differ, the defendant-respondent was not entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law at the time of the granting of Summary Judgment.

See,

57 Am. Jur. 2d. Negligenae §9.
POINT III
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
Summary Judgment shall be rendered if the supporting documents "show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law".

See Durfey v. Bd. of

Ed. of Wayne City., Etc., (Ut., 1979) 604 P.2d 480.
Moreover, the Utah cases hold that on Summary Judgment the
adverse party is entitled to have the court view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the adverse party.

Bihlmaier v. Carson, (Ut., 1979) 603
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P.2d 790; Pioneer Savings and Loan Association v. Pioneer Finance and
Thrift Company, (Ut., 1966) 18 Utah 2d 106, 417 P.2d 121 at 123; ~
Ford Motor Company, (Ut., 1964) 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62.
In a recent case before this court, the court stated "in rev':
ing the record on any appeal from Summary Judgment, we treat the statemew
and evi dentury materials of the appellant as if the jury would receive er'
as the only creditable evidence, and we sustain the judgment only if no
issues of fact which could affect the outcome can be discerned".

Blodget·

Martsch, (Ut., 1978) 590 P.2d 298 at 300.
In the present case the plaintiff-appellant alleges that the
failure of the defendant-respondent to perform his duties in a diligent
manner constitutes negligence.

As discussed in Point I, above, the

plaintiff-appellant's averment clearly constitutes a genuine claim and i1
in conflict with defendant-respondent's claim of no negligence.
The trial court should not have granted Summary Judgment for ti:
defendant-respondent because there existed on the record a dispute

coo~~

whether or not the defendant-respondent was in fact negligent.
Furthermore, courts have been reluctant to grant Summary
Judgment on questions of negligence.

See Prestone v. Lamb, (Ut., 1968) 1t

Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 at 1022; Corbridge v. M. Morrison and Son,~·
(Ut., 1967)19 Utah 2d 407, 432 P.2d 41.

The court in Singleton v.

Alexander, supra, quotes as authority the following language found in
38 Am. Jur. Negligence §345:
The right of a party in a negligence action to have
the jury pass upon the question of liability becomes

-8-
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absolute . . . when the proof discloses such a state of
fact~, whether.c?n~roverted or.n~t, that, in essaying
to fix responsibility for the inJury or damage, different
minds may arrive reasonably at different conclusions or
may disagree reasonably as to the inferences to be drawn
from the facts. Thus, . . . where negligence may
reasonably and legitimately be inferred from the evidence
it is for the jury to say whether negligence shall be so '
inferred . . . . The inferences to be drawn from the
evidence must be certain and incontrovertible to be
decided by the court; otherwise, they must be determined
by the jury . . . .
The question of the defendant's liability lawfully
can be withdrawn from a jury and determined by the court
as a question of law when, and only when, the facts are
indisputable, being stipulated, found by the court or jury,
established by evidence that is free from conflict, and
raises an inference which is so certain that all reasonable men, in the exercise of a fair and impartial judgment,
must agree upon it and grant the same conclusion.
(Emphasis added.)
Whether or not the defendant-respondent failed to perform his
duty in a lawyerlike manner is certainly an issue of dispute in the present
case.

The plaintiff-appellant alleges that the defendant-respondent had

informed her that the foreclosure sale would be stopped if the plaintiffappellant could provide $400.00.

The plaintiff-appellant in reliance upon

the defendant-respondent's advise provided the defendant-respondent the
money before the scheduled date of sale.

The defendant-respondent, as her

attorney, violated the trust placed in him by the plaintiff-appellant in
that he failed to do anything whatsoever after receiving the money, to
prevent the sale.
Defendant-respondent's advise to plaintiff-appellant to redeem
her home after the sheriff's sale does not erase the previous negligence
on the part of the defendant-respondent.

Furthermore, the fact that the

defendant-respondent failed to explain to the plaintiff-appellant any of
-9-
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the basic steps necessary for redemption is further evidence of the
defendant-respondent's complete disregard for the welfare of the plaintiff.
appellant and his negligence in handling the matter entrusted to him by tne
plaintiff-appellant.
In conclusion, the plaintiff-appellant would like to call the
court's attention to a statement made by this court in Tangren v. Ingalls,
(Ut., 1961) 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 P.2d 179 at 184:
The sustaining of summary motions without affording
the party an opportunity to present his evidence is a
stringent measure which the court should be reluctant to
grant . . . . Accardi ngly, the p ri vil ege of presenting
evidence should be denied only, when taking the view most
favorable to the party's claims he cannot in any event
establish a right to redress under the law; and unless it
clearly so appears doubts should be resolved in favor of
permitting him to go to trial.
SUMMARY
Plaintiff-appellant urges the court to vacate the Summary
Judgment of no cause of action granted by the trial court against the
plaintiff-appellant, and to remand this matter for a trial on the merits ai
to the defendant-respondent's negligence and liability.

Respectfully submitted,
WILKINS &WILKINS
'

.

./-

I I -

ih~J/-)i0 ~
Mi cltae 1 J. Wi 1kins
../
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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